The Status of Monitoring Mechanisms and the New Regulation on Returns cla_team July 10, 2026

The Status of Monitoring Mechanisms and the New Regulation on Returns

One year ago, the “Voice in Bulgaria” Legal Aid Center participated in a civil society hearing as part of the fourth cycle of the UN Universal Periodic Review on human rights in Bulgaria. As a UN member state, Bulgaria undergoes this review once every five years.

 

In the final phase, however, a delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented in November 2025 the main legislative changes and initiatives undertaken in response to the recommendations made to Bulgaria during the previous review in 2020.  In the subsequent so-called “interactive dialogue,” more than 90 UN member states made statements, presenting their observations and recommendations regarding the human rights situation in Bulgaria.

 

In the area of the fundamental rights of migrants and asylum seekers, Bulgaria has received the following recommendations, among others:

Ensure adequate reception conditions for refugees and asylum seekers;
Ensure compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and effective protection against forced returns;
Establish alternatives to immigration detention;
Establish effective integration mechanisms;
Ensure independent monitoring of external borders.

With regard to the recommendations made, Bulgaria will have a new five-year period to implement them. If current trFor the UN Universal Periodic Review itself, such a development would mean an increase in formalism and a devaluation of international mechanisms for the protection of human rights, as well as a real risk that they might not exist at all until Bulgaria’s next review.

On June 12, 2026, Bulgaria began implementing the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. Among the new elements in the national refugee system is the introduction of screening in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1356.

Both the regulation and the National Plan for the Implementation of the Covenant provide for the establishment of a national mechanism to monitor respect for human rights, which is to be entrusted to the Office of the Ombudsman. At this time, however, the draft amendment to the Ombudsman Act has not been finalized.

It also remains unclear what financial and expert resources have been allocated to ensure that this sole monitoring mechanism can begin operating as soon as the Pact enters into force. In practice, this means that the authorities are launching the screening processes without an operational mechanism in place to monitor compliance with fundamental human rights.

On June 17, 2026, the European Parliament approved the new EU Regulation on the return of third-country nationals. Following the Parliament’s approval, the text must be formally adopted by the Council and published in the Official Journal before it can enter into force. Certain provisions, including those concerning return centers, the age assessment of minors, and the external dimension of return, will apply immediately. Other provisions that require preparatory steps will take effect 12 months after the legislation enters into force.

Overall, the new Regulation does not provide for any substantial mechanisms to ensure respect for fundamental rights. Moreover, the adopted text, specifically Article 15, states that the monitoring of forced returns will be carried out through existing monitoring mechanisms established in the Screening Regulation. Specifically, Article 15 states that the monitoring of forced returns will be carried out through existing monitoring mechanisms established in the Screening Regulation. Again, in our national context, the implementation of the Screening Regulation is de facto beginning without a functioning monitoring mechanism, as explicitly provided for. Furthermore, in the final version of the provision on monitoring, the explicitly stipulated obligations of the authorities to notify and ensuring access to forced return procedures. In practice, this leads to a situation in which yet another monitoring mechanism becomes a mere formality—stripped of resources and deprived of any real ability not only to ensure compliance with requirements but also to enforce them or hold the authorities accountable.

 

In contrast, the newly adopted Regulation provides for:

An extension of the maximum detention period to 24 months, with the possibility of a further extension of 6 months: Article 32;
An expansion of the grounds for imposing detention: Article 29;

The assumption that the risk of absconding can be justified by a lack of housing or social ties: Art. 29a;
Creating a risk of indefinite detention for individuals identified as a threat to national security: Article 16(3)(d). Provision is also made for these individuals to be detained in prisons: Article 16(3)(c);

Provision for the possibility, in the event of a lack of capacity in specialized centers, for detained persons to be housed in prisons, with the requirement for separation from other inmates significantly relaxed in the final version of Article 34;
Introduction of electronic monitoring as an alternative to detention: Article 23(1)(b);
Permission for the detention of unaccompanied minors, with the measure subject to an ex officio review every three months, which in practice allows for detention for at least that period: Article 33

Extension of the period for reviewing detention from the originally stipulated minimum of three months to six months: Art. 33(1);
Possibility of returning individuals to third countries with which they have no genuine ties: Art. 17

Introduction of sanctions in the event of a person’s failure to cooperate, including through restrictions on access to rights: Article 23b of the adopted text.

All of this effectively demonstrates the inability of existing mechanisms to counteract the negative and intensifying legislative and practical trends that are leading to the erosion of fundamental human rights. Instead of being reformed and enhanced with effective tools for monitoring and ensuring respect for fundamental human rights, their existing shortcomings are deepening, leading to the complete erosion of the mechanisms themselves.

Prepared with the support of the Swiss-Bulgarian Cooperation Program, Mechanism for Civic Engagement and Transparency (MCEP) 2024–2029. The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the governments of Switzerland and Bulgaria.